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Abstract
This paper is about limit pricing under complete information and intertemporal market
demands. If pre-entry and post-entry market demands are correlated, then limit pricing can be
an equilibrium strategy even under complete information without government intervention.
Furthermore, with government intervention, limiting entry via government dominates self-
limiting strategy for the incumbent monopolist. The entry regulation by the benevolent
government to prevent excess entry is exploited by the incumbent as a way to protect monopoly
position. As a result, the social welfare with entry regulation is lower than under pure market
equilibrium. The idea of this paper is general enough to be applied to other dynamic models of
sequential entry like a location model of product di#erentiation.
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I. Introduction
The strategic behavior of the incumbent ﬁrm confronting new entrant is the key to the
study of dynamics of market structure. Even though the incumbent sometimes has an incentive
to invite entry, it is more natural that the incumbent ﬁrm wants to deter entry.
1 There can be
various ways to deter entry, however, one common condition must be satisﬁed to e#ectively
deter entry; the incumbent’s action in the pre-entry period must be able to a#ect the
proﬁtability of new entrants in the post-entry period.
There are several channels through which the incumbent ﬁrm can a#ect the proﬁtability
of new entrants. Recall that the proﬁt of a new entrant depends on its own cost, the cost of the
incumbent, and the market demand in post-entry period. Then it is not di$cult to see that
 This paper was ﬁrst written while I stayed at the Institute of Economic Research of the Hitotsubashi
University during 2000 academic year. I truly appreciate Hitotsubashi University for the research support and
warm hospitality. The work was also supported by the Korea Research Foundation Grant (KRF-2000).
1 There are some situations that the incumbent beneﬁts from new entrants. For example, Economides (1996)
shows that under network externality with complementarities, the incumbent ﬁrm may have incentive to invite
entry, and Farrell and Gallini (1988) proves incumbent’s incentive to invite entry when consumers have to incur
setup costs.
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entrants, and restricting future market demand to discourage entry are the main strategies of
the incumbent.
Limit pricing theory originated by Bain (1949, 1956), Modigliani (1958), and Sylos-
Labini (1962) focuses on incumbent’s behavior to make future market demand unproﬁtable to
the new entrant. However, due to the development of game theory, the original idea of the
limit pricing is rejected as an optimal strategy of the incumbent. It is because limit-pricing
strategy does not satisfy the subgame perfection criterion. Since then the main result of the
limit pricing theory changes to that in a complete information entry game, limit pricing cannot
be an equilibrium strategy.
It is Milgrom and Roberts (1982) that initiates the revival of limit pricing under
incomplete information. They show that under incomplete information, pre-entry stage price
can be a signal of the incumbent’s cost, and so can a#ect the entry decision of the potential
competitors. Following Milgrom and Roberts, there have been a lot of researches that expand
signaling strategies to a#ect new entrant’s perception of the future proﬁtability.
2
We should be careful to notice that there are two key assumptions in rejecting the original
limit pricing theory; complete information and time-independent market demands. Milgrom and
Roberts refer to Friedman (1979) this way: “Friedman notes that, under the usual sort of
assumptions on demand, the proﬁts which would accrue should entry occur are completely
independent of the pre-entry price. … Friedman’s argument will be generally valid in any
complete-information, game-theoretic model in which the established ﬁrm’s pre-entry actions do
not inﬂuence post-entry costs and demand”. Even though the assumption of time-independent
market demands is only implicitly described, it is clear that there must be no strategic links
between pre-entry and post-entry market demands for Friedman’s argument to be valid.
While the role of the incomplete information in the limit pricing analysis is now
well-known, the importance of the exogenous market demand assumption in Friedman’s
argument is not equally recognized. It is not di$cult to verify that exogenous market demand
in each period is still the standard assumption in entry model.
3 However, if market demands
are intertemporally linked, then the incumbent can a#ect post-entry market structure through
its own pre-entry action even under complete information. In this paper, it will be conﬁrmed
that under intertemporal market demands limit pricing revives as an equilibrium strategy
without assuming incomplete information.
Based on such a basic limit pricing analysis, what is more interesting in this paper is the
fact that limit pricing is reinforced by entry regulation. It is common for the benevolent
government to regulate entry to prevent excess competition. The excess entry theorem
successfully proves that the free market may generate too many ﬁrms without government
intervention.
4 However, once we introduce entry regulation following the recommendation of
2 The basic model of Milgrom and Roberts is also extended to the oligopoly limit pricing under incomplete
information. See Bagwell and Ramey (1991) and Schultz (1999).
3 Kim (1993) questions the tradition of assuming the same exogenously given market demand in each period in
IO, particularly in the analysis of the multiperiod dynamics like entry games. The consumptions of the pre-entry
and post-entry periods are normally assumed to be substitutes and so the current price should a#ect future
demand. Even though Kim shows the importance of time-dependent demands in analyzing dynamics of the market
structure, he does not explicitly model incumbent’s strategic entry deterring behavior.
4 See Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Perry (1984), Spulber (1981), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) and von
Weiza ¨ cker (1980a, 1980b) for the excess entry theorem and its policy recommendation of entry regulation.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,excess entry theorem, the incumbent’s incentive will change drastically since it now has an
additional way to deter entry, inducing government to regulate entry.
Under intertemporal market demands and entry regulation, the incumbent monopolist
has two kinds of limit pricing strategies: self-deterring and limiting entry via government’s
intervention. Self-deterring is the conventional limit pricing such that the incumbent lowers
pre-entry stage price to make post-entry market demand small and so entry unproﬁtable. On
the other hand, limit pricing via government is lowering current price to make future demand
small so that further entry is socially undesirable, that is excessive, even though it may be
desirable to the entrant. Since the latter is less costly than the former, the incumbent
strategically generates a situation of excessive competition with further entry and triggers
government’s entry regulation. Entry regulation by the benevolent government protects
monopoly position at the cost of social welfare.
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, if current and future market demands
are correlated, then limit pricing can be an equilibrium strategy under complete information
without government intervention (section III). Second, with government intervention, limit-
ing entry via government dominates self-limiting strategy for the incumbent monopolist
(section IV). Third, the entry regulation to prevent excess entry is exploited by the incumbent
as a way to protect monopoly position, and as a result the social welfare with entry regulation,
which is aimed at enhancing e$ciency, is lower than under pure market equilibrium (section
V).
5 Finally, the idea of this paper is general enough to be applied to other dynamic models
of sequential entry. As an example, the ine$ciency of entry regulation is also proved in a
simple model of horizontal product di#erentiation (section VI).
II. Intertemporal Market Demands
Assume intertemporal market demands for t1 and t2 as follows where xi is the total output




Intertemporally linked market demands are natural in economic analyses. Consumers’
intertemporal consumption decisions, pricing of the durable goods, location theory with
sequential entry are some examples.
7 Especially, intertemporal market demand is an appropri-
ate speciﬁcation in dynamics models such as entry game unless the product is perishable so that
5 This is worth a special note since it means that the policy recommendation of the excess entry theorem is
misleading. Kim (1997) proves that, under a di#erent model speciﬁcation, entry regulation to prevent excess entry
lowers social welfare contrary to the expectation of the excess entry literature. This paper reconﬁrms Kim’s result
with intertemporal market demands along the evolutionary path of the limit pricing theory.















2). Introducing discount factor for the future consump-
tion adds no further insight.
7 In a location model with sequential entry, the incumbent’s location choice in the pre-entry period a#ects the
proﬁtability and the social value of new entrant in the post-entry period.
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8
Once demands are interrelated over time, the incumbent’s strategic choice of a current
price (or any other strategic variables) to a#ect market condition in the post-entry stage
becomes an important aspect of the analysis. We assume c(0, 1), implying that current and
future consumptions are substitutes and the cross price e#ect is less than the direct price e#ect.
At t1, consumers make intertemporal consumption decisions with some expectations about
future price p2, or equivalently about future entry, which should be fulﬁlled in equilibrium.
III. Self-limit Pricing
Consider a two-person two-stage game assuming that there is no government intervention
at all. At t1 ﬁrm 1 is a monopolist choosing x1 (or p1). At t2 ﬁrm 2 decides on entry, and if it




9 If ﬁrm 2 does not enter, ﬁrm 1 maintains its monopoly position producing
x
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2 be the market prices at t2 under duopoly and under monopoly respectively,




2 in the same way.
Assume that the production costs are zero for both ﬁrms, then it is easy to ﬁnd that, in the






















10 Therefore ﬁrm 1 can deter ﬁrm 2’s entry with p1p
o
1,
however, we have to check if such a limit pricing is consistent with ﬁrm 1’s self-interest.


















Note that consumers have perfect foresight when they make consumption decisions at t1
such that E( p2p1)p
M
2 ( p1)i fp1p
o




1. This is a condition for
a fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium. Consumer expectation about future price, or equivalently
about future market structure, as a function of current price, should be consistent with the
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2]. Then, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the entry game





1 , then p* 1p
M






1, then limit pricing
p* 1p
o




1, then p* 1p
D
1 and
entry is accommodated by the incumbent ﬁrm.
8 If products are perishable within each period, then c0.
9 This is for the simplicity of notations and refers to the symmetric Cournot equilibrium in the post-entry stage.
10 If entry cost F is so small and/or the market size a is large enough so that (3F a)/c is negative, then
p
o
10, which means that there will be an entry for all p10.
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1 where the incumbent deters entry by
lowering pre-entry period price, that is, limit pricing is the optimal strategy of the incumbent.
The incumbent does not choose p
M
1 because then ﬁrm 2 comes into the market to make
incumbent’s proﬁts at B, not at A, but chooses a lower price p
o




























. Then Lemma 1 can be rewritten in terms of
entry cost F as follows.
Proposition 1.I fFF
M, then p* 1p
M
1 and entry is blockaded. If F
MFF
L, then p* 1p
o
1 (limit
pricing) and entry is deterred. If F
LF, then p* 1p
D
1 and entry is accommodated.
When entry cost is large enough, there will be no entry even though the incumbent does
not try to deter entry. On the other hand, if entry cost is su$ciently small, entry cannot be
deterred, or more correctly, deterring entry is too costly to be adopted by the incumbent. For
intermediate values of entry cost, the incumbent will adopt limit pricing strategy and maintain
its monopoly position.
Proposition 1 shows that limit pricing can be an optimal strategy of the incumbent ﬁrm
even under complete information if market demands are intertemporally linked. The intuition
behind Proposition 1 is extremely simple and based on the introductory economics. When the
current and the future consumptions are substitutes, the incumbent ﬁrm has an incentive to
lower current monopoly price to make future market demand small enough to make entry
unproﬁtable. If the proﬁt gain from maintaining the monopoly position in the future is more
than o#setting the proﬁt loss in the pre-entry monopoly period due to a lowered price, then
limit pricing becomes an equilibrium strategy of the incumbent ﬁrm.
F><.1 . S :A;-A>B>I PG>8>C<
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It is not only the incumbent ﬁrm that might want to discourage entry. The benevolent
government wants to deter entry if free market generates too many ﬁrms in terms of social
welfare. This is what excess entry theorem cares about. Excess entry theorem successfully
shows that if (1) ﬁrms produce homogeneous products, (2) there exists business-stealing e#ect,
and (3) market competition is imperfect due to entry cost and/or scale economy, then free
market equilibrium number of ﬁrms is greater than the social optimum.
11 The natural policy
implication of the excess entry theorem is therefore government’s entry regulation to prevent
excess market entry. However, the theorem, even though it deals with oligopoly, or imperfect
competition markets, ignores ﬁrms’ strategic behavior against government intervention, and so
the policy recommendation of the excess entry theorem is misleading as we show in this paper.
Excess entry depends on market size and entry cost, and it is more probable with small
market demand and/or with large entry cost. Therefore, when current and future consump-
tions are substitutes as in our model, if the incumbent monopolist charges a low price in t1,
market demand in t2 becomes small and so further entry might be socially excessive.
Government intervention provides the incumbent with additional way to deter entry:
inducing entry regulation. Now the incumbent has two alternatives to deter entry; deter entry
by its own limit pricing strategy as in the previous section, and deter entry by generating the
situation of excess entry and so inducing the government to regulate entry. Both strategies can
be implemented by lowering current price and making future market demand small relative to
entry cost. The question is which is more attractive to the incumbent; discouraging entry via
self-limit pricing or inducing government to regulate entry?
To show that, for the incumbent monopolist, inducing government’s entry regulation
dominates deterring entry by itself, let’s introduce a benevolent government into the model.
Then the game structure changes slightly such that when ﬁrm 2 decides to enter, the
government either allows or denies entry. As the excess entry theorem literature proposes,
optimal entry regulation is to allow entry if social welfare at t2 is higher under duopoly than
under monopoly, and to reject entry otherwise.
Deﬁne social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and ﬁrm’s proﬁt ignoring entry cost.
It is easy to see that the social welfare at t2 is W
D
24(acp1)










welfare increment at t2 with entry given p1. The benevolent government should allow entry if
DW2F and reject entry otherwise.
Note p
D
2DW2 in Figure 2, which implies that welfare increment due to additional
entry is less than the proﬁt of the new entrant. This observation that entry is more attractive
to the entrant than to the whole society is the intuitive basis of the main results of this paper:
limit-pricing entry via government is less costly to the incumbent than self-limiting.
It is obvious that both entry decision of ﬁrm 2 and the government’s entry regulation
depend on the entry cost F. More speciﬁcally, in Figure 2,i fF5a
2/72 then ﬁrm 2’s entry
cannot be deterred by ﬁrm 1 and it is also allowed by the government for any p10. On the
other hand, if Fa
2/9 then entry is deterred by ﬁrm 1 (and would be also rejected by the
11 See Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for the business-stealing e#ect.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 0government) with low p1, rejected by the government (while it is not deterred by ﬁrm 1) with
intermediate value of p1, and allowed both by ﬁrm 1 and by the government for high p1.
Finally, if F(5a
2/72, a
2/9], then entry cannot be deterred by the incumbent monopolist itself
with any p10, however, entry can be rejected by the government for a low p1. Since our main
interest is in the case that limiting entry through government regulation is easier or less costly
to the incumbent than deterring entry by itself through self-limit pricing, assume intermediate





Note that Assumption 1 is not restrictive. Even in the case of Fa
2/9, we can see that
entry is deterred more easily through government entry regulation than by the incumbent’s
limit pricing strategy. The incumbent should choose a substantially low price to deter entry by





2/72F such that DW2F if p1p
G
1 and DW2F if p1p
G
1.
Lemma 2. Assume that F(5a
2/72, a
2/9]. Entry cannot be deterred by the incumbent
monopolist’s self-limit pricing strategy for any p10. However, entry is regulated by the
benevolent government if p1p
G
1, and entry is allowed otherwise.
Lemma 2 says that the incumbent ﬁrm, even when it cannot deter entry by itself for any
price p10, can deter entry by inducing government entry regulation. If ﬁrm 1 chooses p1p
G
1,
then the post-entry period market demand becomes small enough compared to entry cost F to
make ﬁrm 2’s entry excessive in terms of social welfare, that is, given p1, social welfare at t2 is
lower in duopoly than in monopoly.
Will ﬁrm 1 actually choose p1p
G
1 to maintain its future monopoly position at the cost of
current monopoly proﬁt? The incumbent’s decision making at t1 is as follows.
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As in the case without government, consumers should have correct expectations about
future price in equilibrium such that E( p2p1)p
M
2 ( p1)i fp1p
G





1. Recall that p
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2]. Then, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the entry game





1 , then ﬁrm 1 chooses p
M
1 and entry is regulated by the government






1, then ﬁrm 1 lowers price down to p
G
1 and entry is regulated




1, then ﬁrm 1 chooses p
D
1 and entry is allowed by the government
(entry accommodated).

















2. Then Lemma 3 can be rewritten in
terms of entry cost F as in the case without government.
Proposition 2.I fFF
MG, then ﬁrm 1 chooses p* 1p
M
1 and entry is regulated by the government
(blockaded entry through regulation). If F
MGFF
LG, then ﬁrm 1 chooses p* 1p
o
1 and entry
is regulated by the government (deterred entry through regulation). If F
LGF, then p* 1p
D
1
and entry is allowed by the government (entry accommodated).
Proposition 2 is an extension of Proposition 1. It shows that limit pricing via government
dominates self-limit pricing in the sense that entry can be deterred by the former strategy even
when it cannot be deterred by the traditional self-limit pricing.
V. Ine$ciency of Entry Regulation
At this point, it should be emphasized that excess entry theorem itself and the policy
recommendation of the theorem are not consistent with each other. More speciﬁcally, excess
entry theorem cannot be a justiﬁcation of government entry regulation. This is because the
entry regulation ignores the strategic reaction by the incumbent ﬁrm.
The incumbent who has an incentive to lower p1 down to p
G
1 to induce entry regulation
would not have adopted such a limit pricing strategy if there were no government intervention
from the beginning. A new entrant might not have generated excess entry without entry
regulation, even though it is regulated because it generates excess entry under government
intervention.
This implies that the welfare standard for entry regulation —c omparing duopoly welfare
with monopoly welfare under the same ﬁrst period price —i s incorrect. Comparing welfare
based on the same p1 seems inevitable to the government who moves only in the second stage
after ﬁrm 1 chooses p1. However, welfare with entry should be evaluated by a di#erent p1 from
that is used to evaluate welfare without entry because the incumbent will choose di#erent
prices at t1 with and without government intervention. The mistake of the excess entry theorem
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 2is comparing two outcomes in di#erent subgames unduly assuming that they occurred in the
same subgame.
The point is that the government policy changes the incentive of the incumbent. The
policy recommendation of the excess entry theorem ignores the simple lesson from the game
theory that any government policy that ignores the reaction of the market is empty. This
section will show that entry regulation, which has a correct goal but a wrong standard, is
exploited by the incumbent as a strategy to protect its monopoly position, and so lowers social
welfare.
Limit pricing can be interpreted as lowering pre-entry market price to deter entry below
the price level that the incumbent would have chosen without entry deterring considerations.







ﬁrm 1 chooses p
G
1 to induce entry regulation, while it would have chosen p
D
1 if there were no
government intervention so that no considerations of entry deterring were taken. Therefore,
































* as the social welfare at t2 under monopoly (with entry regulation)












2, which are evaluated at the same p1. Since p1 is equal to p
D
1 without entry
regulation, and equal to p
G


































such that limit pricing via government is
an equilibrium strategy with government intervention, while the incumbent monopolist cannot
deter entry by itself, social welfare at t2 is higher without entry regulation than with entry







































*. Q. E. D
Figure 3 explains why entry regulation is subgame optimal, however, it is suboptimal
in the whole entry game. Figure 3 is a reduced form of the entry game between the incumbent
and the regulator. When the government decides on entry regulation, it compares monopoly
proﬁt with duopoly proﬁt. In the subgame starting after the incumbent chooses an accommo-
dating price p
D
1 the regulator allows entry since W
D*FW
M. On the other hand, in the
subgame after ﬁrm 1 chooses an entry-deterring price p
M
1 , the government disallows entry
because W
DFW
M*. It is no doubt that the government acts optimally in each subgame.
The incumbent, knowing correctly about the choices of the government in each subgame,
12 This is to focus on the main theme of the paper without incurring complicated calculation. It is possible that
p
G




1 ). In this case, entry is deterred by the regulation, however, the second period
market becomes larger than without entry regulation. Since such a range is small and the proof is still valid in the
neighborhood of p
D
1 by continuity, and furthermore, since focusing on limit pricing is enough for our purpose, we
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M
1 , since the proﬁt in the subgame with no entry (due to
regulation) is higher than that in the subgame with entry, that is, p
M*p
D*. However, in this
case, W
D*W
M*. This means that, even though the government does its best to enhance
e$ciency, it fails to bring the best outcome to the society. The incumbent chooses a path of the
entry game that is most favorable to itself while undesirable to the whole society.
VI. Robustness: An Application
The policy recommendation of anti-competitive intervention by the benevolent govern-
ment is a common feature in various market competition models. The excess entry theorem
itself is about the quasi-Cournot type market competition with sequential entry. However,
excess entry can be observed in other market models, too. For example, in the analysis of
product di#erentiation, whether market generates too many brands is one of the standard
questions. Even though there seems no unanimous answer to this, if someone obtains a result
that free market with sequential entry generates excessive brands, he concludes his paper,
without an exception, with an anti-competitive policy recommendation. The similar conclusion
can be found in R&D competition, capacity investment, and etc. The main theme of this paper
that government intervention a#ects the incumbent’s incentive, and the resulting critic on the
policy recommendation of excess entry theorem, can be applied to these similar situations. To
conﬁrm the generality of the problem, let’s examine a simple model of product di#erentiation
with sequential entry.
Consider a linear location model a ◊la Hotelling. The length of the product space is 1 and
F><.3 . I C:;;>8>:C8N D; ECIGN R:<JA6I>DC
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product space with total measure 1. Assume that ﬁrm 1 is already located at 1/4 at t1, and ﬁrm
2 enters market at t2 and ﬁrm 3 chooses its location sequentially at t3 with entry cost F0. To
make our analysis simple and to focus on the validity of the entry regulation, assume ﬁxed
prices for all brands.
13 Note that, in a location model with sequential entry, market demands
of pre-entry and post-entry stages are interrelated since the incumbent’s location choice a#ects
the demand of the post-entry period.
First, without government intervention, the equilibrium of the sequential location game is
(l2, l3)(3/4, 1/2). Firm 2 chooses its location at 3/4 correctly expecting that ﬁrm 3 will enter
at 1/2. Entry cost F is assumed to be less than 1/4, which is ﬁrm 3’s post-entry proﬁt. Note that
in this situation the ﬁrm 2 cannot deter ﬁrm 3 no matter what location ﬁrm 2 chooses.
14
Since we assume ﬁxed prices, social welfare in the subgame starting after ﬁrm 3 enters can
be evaluated by the total social cost, which is the sum of total disutility of the consumers, that
is, total transportation costs, and ﬁrm 3’s entry cost F. Total social cost under pure market








Now assume that the government is in the market with entry regulation. Then ﬁrm 2 will
strategically change its location to induce the government to regulate ﬁrm 3’s entry as long as
such a behavior raises its own proﬁt. What happens if ﬁrm 2 chooses at 1/2 instead of at 3/4?
15
It is clear that ﬁrm 3 will choose its location at 1/2 (slightly right to ﬁrm 2). However, if this
happens at t3, social welfare will be lowered with entry because consumers’ total disutility does
not change but new entry incurs social cost F. The benevolent government will reject ﬁrm 3’
s entry, and it is obvious that ﬁrm 2 prefers this (duopoly) to allowing ﬁrm 3’s entry (oligopoly












Note that entry cost is not included in the total social cost under government entry regulation.
Finally, does entry regulation really protect social welfare by preventing excess entry? The
answer is negative when F5/64 since TC*TC
G. To sum, when F5/64, entry cannot be
deterred by the incumbent ﬁrm itself; however, it will be regulated by the benevolent
government. Furthermore, social welfare is lower under entry regulation than under pure
market equilibrium even though entry regulation is evoked to prevent excess entry. The entry
regulation which aims at preventing socially undesirable excess entry turns out to prevent
socially desirable competition and protects incumbents’ interests at the cost of social welfare.
13 This simple model is based on Shy (1995), pp.156-159.
14 There is a late-mover advantage in this ﬁxed price sequential entry model so that any other location choice by
ﬁrm 2 than 3/4 will lower ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt and raises ﬁrm 3’s proﬁt. That is to say that ﬁrm 2’s location at 3/4 gives
minimum proﬁt to ﬁrm 3.
15 This is not an equilibrium location. The optimal choice of ﬁrm 2 will be at 1/4 correctly expecting that ﬁrm 3
will choose also at 1/4, which will be rejected by the government. I choose a less drastic situation which is enough
for demonstrating the main point.
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The main results of the paper are as follows. First, limit pricing revives as an optimal
strategy of the incumbent ﬁrm with intertemporal market demands even under complete
information. Second, limit pricing via government dominates self-limit pricing. Third, entry
regulation to prevent excess entry is exploited by the incumbent to protect its monopoly
position so that social welfare is lower under entry regulation than under free market. Finally,
the idea of this paper is general enough to be applied to other dynamic models of sequential
entry with and without government intervention.
It is not much surprising that limit pricing emerges as an equilibrium strategy when
current and future consumptions are substitutes. Intertemporal demands provide a channel
through which the incumbent’s action in the pre-entry stage can a#ect new entrant’s proﬁtabi-
lity in the post-entry period. What is more striking in our analysis is that limiting entry through
entry regulation is very much attractive to the incumbent, that is, it dominates self-limit
pricing strategy, and so harmful to the whole society.
The entry regulation, which aims at preventing excess entry and saving social welfare, is
exploited by the incumbent to maintain its monopoly position at the cost of social welfare.
Entry regulation, which is optimal only in the subgame starting after the incumbent’ move,
turns out to be suboptimal in the whole entry regulation game.
Two related issues can be raised as concluding remarks. The ﬁrst is designing a general
model which assumes both intertemporal market demands and asymmetric information. If we
combine intertemporal demands and asymmetric information about incumbent’s cost, then
limiting entry might become easier than with just one model speciﬁcation. It is because
choosing a low price as a signal of low cost to prevent entry reinforces entry deterring by
making future market demand small.
Another question is how the benevolent government can overcome its strategic disadvan-
tage against the incumbent ﬁrm. The government might disallow a low price by the incumbent
monopolist which strategically generates excess entry in case of new entry. However, can it be
acceptable by the public? Disallowing a low price to prevent ﬁrms’ strategic behavior of entry
deterring is similar to regulating predatory pricing or traditional limit pricing. We need to
check the validity of such a regulation as we did regarding entry regulation suggested by excess
entry theorem.
Note that the ine$ciency of the entry regulation is not due to the government’s late-mover
disadvantage in entry regulation game. There will be no change in the result if we assume that
entry regulation, the condition of entry permission, is predetermined even before there exists
a new entrant, even though the optimal entry regulation when the government moves ﬁrst and
takes incumbent’s strategic reaction into considerations will be di#erent from that presented in
this paper.
16 What is crucial is that the regulator only cares about the aggregate market
performance, not about who produces how much. As long as the incumbent’s choice of low
price is not regulated, entry regulation is subject to incumbent’s strategic exploitation.
16 As the anonymous referee points out, such a conjecture needs to be conﬁrmed with a full derivation of the
new equilibrium. We save this issue for future research.
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